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Abstract—Over the past decade, online social networks
(OSNs) such as Twitter and Facebook have thrived and
experienced rapid growth to over 1 billion users. A major
evolution would be to leverage the characteristics of OSNs to
evaluate the effectiveness of the many routing schemes developed
by the research community in real-world scenarios. In this
demonstration, we showcase the Secure Opportunistic Schemes
(SOS) middleware which allows different routing schemes to
be easily implemented relieving the burden of security and
connection establishment. The feasibility of creating a delay
tolerant social network is demonstrated by using SOS to enable
AlleyOop Social, a secure delay tolerant networking research
platform that serves as a real-life mobile social networking
application for iOS devices. AlleyOop Social allows users to
interact, publish messages, and discover others that share
common interests in an intermittent network using Bluetooth,
peer-to-peer WiFi, and infrastructure WiFi.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, online social networks (OSNs) such
as Twitter and Facebook have thrived and experienced rapid
growth to over 1 billion users [1]. A major limitation of OSNs
is the dependence on Internet which is often sparse, difficult
to maintain, or unavailable in rural areas or developing com-
munities. In developed communities with cellular infrastruc-
ture, networks can become overwhelmed by too many users,
particularly during emergencies. In natural disaster situations,
Internet and cellular communication infrastructures can be
severely disrupted, prohibiting users from notifying family,
friends, and associates about safety, location, food, water, and
other resources. In addition, natural disasters typically damage
infrastructure, which increases network traffic demands on any
available undamaged infrastructure, causing congestion and
delays.
Opportunistic communication can seamlessly supplement
Internet connectivity when needed and keep communication
channels open even during high-use and extreme situations.
Furthermore, opportunistic communication can also serve as
a low-cost solution for smart cities, allowing developing and
metropolitan areas to route smart city data through mobile and
stationary nodes such as pedestrians, vehicles, street lights,
public transportation. DTN routing has the ability to deliver
data in an intermittent network, but a major challenge for DTN
routing is assessing real-world performance [2], [3], [4]. To
truly understand the reliability of DTNs and their ability to
support social networks, it is imperative that DTN routing
schemes are evaluated in vivo with use-cases that are repli-
cable, comparable, and available to a variety of researchers.
In this demonstration, we present the Secure Opportunis-
tic Schemes (SOS) middleware, a novel middleware that
facilitates secure message delivery in cases where mobile
connectivity is limited, unavailable, or non-existent. The SOS
middleware supports real-life delay tolerant social networks
on mobile devices. This allows mobile devices to leverage
SOS to dynamically deliver messages to interested nodes when
network infrastructure is not available and improve message
delivery when infrastructure is available. Additionally, the
AlleyOop Social research platform is leveraged, which serves
as an overlay application for SOS to create a delay tolerant
social network for Apple iOS devices [5]. AlleyOop Social is
named after the basketball play known as an “alley oop”. An
“alley oop” occurs when one player throws the ball close to the
basket, but it is not able to reach the final destination. While
the ball is in flight, a teammate that is closer to the basket
catches the ball and scores. In the same regard, AlleyOop
Social enables wireless mobile users to communicate over
longer distances by sending messages that cannot reach the
final destination, but are “caught” by intermediate mobile
devices, which continue to catch and pass the messages until
they are delivered to the final destination.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, a number of social-aware and social-based
routing schemes have leveraged social interactions to deliver
data using delay tolerant networks (DTNs) [14]. However,
related work has primarily evaluated routing protocols in
simulation environments, which provide valuable analyses,
but are based on synthetic mobility patterns to emulate node
movement and tend to use abstract models to imitate the radio
response of real commodity wireless technologies[2], [3], [4].
There are a few studies that have taken on the approach
of demonstrating DTNs in realistic environments [15], [16],
Fig. 1. SOS middleware system stack - green represents mobile applications
created by developers, orange represents the modular routing layer consisting
of multiple opportunistic schemes created by academic researchers, blue
represents foundational layers in the middleware that consist of encryption,
authentication, peer discovery, connection management, and data dissemina-
tion. Managers marked with the color “blue” cannot be modified by mobile
application developers or academic researchers.
[17]. However, these studies do not consider other significant
aspects, such as user security and privacy along with the
limitation of operating with only the epidemic routing scheme.
Various middlewares [18], [19], [20], [21], testbeds [22], [23],
[24], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], and mobile applications have
been developed to address providing deployable delay toler-
ant networking applications which can operate with minimal
infrastructure and effectively evaluate DTN routing protocols.
III. SECURE OPPORTUNISTIC SCHEMES (SOS)
MIDDLEWARE
The SOS middleware is an underlying framework that turns
the AlleyOop Social research platform into a delay tolerant
mobile social network. The SOS middleware takes a modular
approach to abstract away much of the complexity involved
in implementing opportunistic routing schemes such as de-
vice dicovery, establishing D2D connections, and handling
device security and privacy. DTNs are intended to provide
an overlay architecture above the existing transport layer and
ensure reliable routing during intermittency [6]. Building on
the knowledge gained from previous middlewares [7], [8],
SOS hides the complexity of the network stack (session and
presentation) within the ad hoc manager, message manager,
and routing manager, allowing any mobile application to run
at the application layer as depicted in Figure 1. Different from
other middlewares such as the Haggle Project [7], a separate
instance of the SOS middleware is intended to run within
each mobile application as opposed to a daemon which often
requires devices to be rooted or jailbroken. Designing SOS in
this manner allows for the middleware to be integrated within
any mobile application in iOS, enabling them to support op-
portunistic communication without jailbreaking devices along
with being compliant with App Store regulations.
A. Application
Mobile applications serve as an overlay to the SOS mid-
dleware. Applications can be of any form such as social
networking, medical, or any other type of application that
would like to share data opportunistically. Mobile applications
are responsible for providing a user interface to users and
storing data to local or online storage systems. The SOS Mid-
dleware provides a number of API’s for sending/receiving data,
surrounding user notification, routing protocol selection, and
security and privacy preferences. Existing mobile applications
can simply add the SOS middleware as a framework and
start using the aforementioned API’s to send and receive data.
Applications are responsible providing the data to be sent as
well as handling data once it has been received and decrypted.
B. Routing manager
The routing manager is responsible for leveraging D2D
connections to transform any application into a delay toler-
ant networking application that delivers messages to out of
range nodes in the midst of intermittency. Routing in SOS is
designed for modularity, permitting additional DTN routing
schemes to be developed on top of the message manager and
run seamlessly under the Application layer. Designing SOS
in this manner allows for a flexible middleware that enables
applications to dynamically change based on user preference
without the need of modifying hardware or other layers in the
software stack. Currently, the routing manager in SOS has two
DTN routing protocols implemented: epidemic routing and
interest-based routing. Epidemic routing is a simple routing
scheme that achieves effectiveness through gratuitous replica-
tion and delivery of messages upon node encounters [9]. The
IB routing protocol operates in a similar manner to epidemic
routing, except, instead of propagating messages to all users,
messages are only propagated to interested users who are
subscribed to the publisher of the original message. Due to
the modular nature of the SOS middleware, additional routing
protocols can be added to the routing manager. APIs are
available to all protocols in the routing manager to facilitate
communication between the message manager and the appli-
cation layer. Both the IB and Epidemic routing protocols are
written in less than 100 lines of Swift code.
C. Message manager
The message manager notifies the respective protocol used
in the routing manager whenever a new peer has been discov-
ered or lost. Additionally, the message manager is responsible
for taking action whenever a connection state changes. For
example, if the disconnection between two users is lost, the
message manager knows what messages were not transferred.
Lastly, the message manager translates messages between the
routing manager and ad hoc manager in a common format for
both layers to interpret.
D. Ad hoc manager
The ad hoc manager manages Apple’s multipeer connectiv-
ity (MPC) framework, which allows communication between
Fig. 2. (a) One-time infrastructure requirement, occurs during account creation to enable DTN security. (b) Decentralized communication between nodes.
iOS, macOS, and tvOS devices using peer-to-peer WiFi, Blue-
tooth personal area networks, or infrastructure WiFi networks1.
To the best of our knowledge, SOS is the first middleware
to leverage MPC to evaluate multiple delay tolerant routing
schemes. The ad hoc manager is responsible for viewing
discovered peers, establishing D2D connections, encrypting
connections, encrypting data from end-to-end, generating keys,
validating certificates, as well as signing and verifying data
sent and received data. Apple’s documentation on how to use
MPC is detailed, but the company does not disclose specific
details on how MPC works. For example, specifics about the
encryption methods MPC uses are not provided. Details about
how the SOS middleware handles security and privacy are
elaborated on in Section IV.
IV. PRIVACY AND SECURITY
In regard to network security there is no “one-size-fits-all”
approach [10]. Security concerns may become exacerbated in
delay tolerant and ad hoc applications where nodes are vulner-
able to attacks such as eavesdropping, denial of service, and
compromised devices. Providing secure communication that
prevents an adversary from accessing and/or modifying data is
a fundamental requirement of any DTN application [11]. Pre-
vious research discusses security in opportunistic applications
conceptually and makes no claims that the implementations
are secure [7]. The intent of the section is to provide a novel,
but simple concept and implementation of an initial layer of
security for DTN protocols and enable the overlaying mobile
application to detect the identity of its users, send encrypted
information, verify the originating source of the information
being forwarded, and ensure that data have not been modified
— all with minimal dependence on centralized infrastructures.
1Apple Inc., Multipeer connectivity framework reference,
https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/MultipeerConnectivity/
Reference/MultipeerConnectivityFramework/
Additional security can be added to AlleyOop Social by in-
corporating mechanisms such as distributing CA functionality
amongst nodes [12], or integrating trust measurements within
the routing schemes [13] available in the routing manager dis-
cussed in Section III. To enable the initial layer of security in
the SOS middleware, AlleyOop Social leverages conventional
public-key infrastructure (PKI) techniques to create a one-time
PKI requirement that occurs during initial download and user-
signup for the application. AlleyOop Social assumes that users
will have Internet connectivity during the initial download and
installation of the mobile app. After the one-time infrastructure
requirement, Internet connectivity is no longer needed for
privacy, security, and message dissemination. The process of
generating keys and receiving X.509 certificates in AlleyOop
Social’s one-time infrastructure requirement is depicted in
Figure 2a.
Using the one-time infrastructure requirement in Figure 2a
is not without limitations. The obvious shortfall is the “one-
time” requirement. A fair assumption is that the AlleyOop
Social application along with others using the SOS middle-
ware will acquire their mobile applications from the Apple
App Store, which currently requires an Internet connection.
Assuming users sign up shortly after acquiring the application
addresses some concerns with the “one-time” requirement.
Additionally, if a connection between a device and the cloud
is somehow compromised, or a malicious device attempts to
provide someone else’s unique user-identifier during user sign-
up, a certificate with the wrong credentials could be generated
by the CA. To circumvent this issue, the cloud can ask the CA
to compare and validate the unique user-identifier provided in
the certificate with the unique user-identifier affiliated with
the logged in user. Other limitations are also prevalent with
the current security scheme such as an Internet connection is
required to revoke specific user certificates, update CA root
certificates, replenish expired certificates, and notify users of
known malicious devices.
(a) AlleyOop Social message forwarder selection (b) AlleyOop Social message forwarder dissemination
Fig. 3. AlleyOop Social message forwarder
V. MESSAGE DISSEMINATION
After sign-up is complete and a mobile device receives its
respective certificate and AlleyOop Social CA root certifi-
cate, the user can disseminate messages to other AlleyOop
Social users using any DTN routing protocol discussed in
Section III-B. Whenever a user creates a message or performs
an action such as follow/unfollow of a user, AlleyOop Social
performs the following two operations: 1) saves the action to
the local database on the mobile device and 2) synchronizes
the action with the cloud when the Internet becomes available.
Once an action is saved to the local database of the device
it can be disseminated using a DTN routing protocol to
interested AlleyOop Social users without the use of Internet.
The following sections expound upon how messages are
disseminated after being created by a user in the AlleyOop
Social application layer and passed to the routing manager.
A. Advertisements and node discovery
Mobile devices roam freely advertising and browsing for
basic information in plain-text to assist other AlleyOop Social
enabled devices with making the decision of whether or not
to request a connection. For example, the epidemic and IB
routing protocols discussed in Section III-B advertises a plain-
text key/value dictionary consisting of UserID/MessageNum-
ber. The key field in the dictionary is a 10 byte unique user
identification string. The value field of the dictionary is the
latest MessageNumber that the advertising device has for the
particular UserID. A browsing node is now able to quickly
decide whether it is interested in the MessageNumber for
the respective UserID string and whether it should request
a connection from the advertising node. Figure 2b depicts a
typical scenario in AlleyOop Social where Bob’s device is
interested in messages from Alice’s device.
B. Forwarder Selection & Dissemination
Depending on the DTN routing protocol being used in the
Routing layer of the mobile device, prospective nodes can
become message forwarders for other users. For example, in
epidemic and IB routing, a node becomes a message forwarder
for a particular user-identifier whenever a new message is
requested and received. When a node becomes a message
forwarder, it follows a similar process to the one outlined
in Figure 2b, with particular differences that are shown in
Figures 3a. Figure 3b shows the interaction between Bob and
Carol when Carol is interested in Alice’s message that Bob is
forwarding. The process is similar to message dissemination
in Figure 2b, except Bob sends his certificate to Carol to
establish an encrypted connection and in addition, forwards
Alice’s certificate.
VI. REAL WORLD EVALUATION
The AlleyOop Social application was available for beta
testing in Apple TestFlight app for 7 days. AlleyOop Social
had thirty one (31) testers who downloaded the application
around the United States. Due to limited amount of users and
a critical mass of users who are socially related to each other,
this section will constrain the results to users who passed
at least one (1) D2D message using the IB routing protocol
in Gainesville, FL. Ten devices used AlleyOop Social in a
∼11km x 8km area depicted in Figure 4b, resulting in users
posting 259 unique messages.
A. Social relationships
Many of the students were friends before the field study
and typically interacted during the school week. Individual
users were given the freedom to choose other users to sub-
scribe to; therefore, all users did not follow each other. The
digraph G(V,E) formed by the total nodes who participated
n = |V (G)| = 10 is depicted in Figure 4a. A social
(a) Social relationship directed graph for the ten (10) active users in
Gainesville, FL
(b) AlleyOop Social map of “active user” message generation (blue) and
message dissemination (red) in a ∼11km x 8km area
(c) Delay (d) Delivery
Fig. 4. AlleyOop Social real world evaluation results
relationship between a node pair i, j ∈ E is an edge ei,j ,
meaning that user i follows user j. The edge ei,j does not
necessarily mean the edge ej,i exists because some users did
not follow each other back as in the case for node 1 and
node 3 in Figure 4a. The density of the social relationships
is 0.64, meaning that the majority of the possible social
relationships were formed naturally by the participating nodes.
The compactness of G can be determined by calculating the
average shortest path length between all node relationship pairs∑
i≥j l(i, j)/
n(n−1)
2 = 1.3, along with the maximum shortest
path length, otherwise known as the diameter d between any
two nodes d(G) = maxi,j∈V l(i, j) = 2. The compactness of
the social relationship graph reveals that even if a user does not
follow another user directly, there is still an indirect follower
that is two degrees away. The center nodes (6 and 7) of the
social relationship graph has a radius of 1 which reflects the
nodes with the smallest eccentricityi,j = maxi,j∈V l(i, j).
Additional features can be determined by translating Fig-
ure 4a to a undirected graph. This means that if a two-
way relationship did not already exist, it will exist in the
undirectional graph making ei,j = ej,i for all i, j ∈ E.
Now the network transitivity is computed to be T (G) =
3 ∗ number of triangles / number of connected triads = 0.80
which measures the extent that a friend k of a friend j is also
a friend of i.
B. Message dissemination
The social relationship graph in Figure 4a provides an
overall understanding of nodes’ interests in messages along
with providing insight into how nodes may cluster due to who
they follow. Figure 4a does not provide any insight on physical
node locations or mobility during the evaluation. Figure 4b
assists with understanding node mobility by showing where
users created messages (blue) and passed messages (red) in
Gainesville, FL. A total of 967 messages were disseminated
from user-to-user using IB routing in AlleyOop Social. The
total amount of subscriptions made by the ten (10) active
users was 46. Figure 4c provide the delay results for messages
disseminated via “1-hop” and “All” hops. In regard to “All”
messages, Figure 4c shows that 0.43 of the messages delivered
had a delay of 24 hours or less, while 0.90 of the messages
had a delay of 94 hours or less. In regard to “1-hop” delay,
that 0.44 of the messages delivered had a delay of 24 hours
or less, while 0.92 of the messages had a delay of 94 hours
or less for “1-hop” messages.
In regard to message delivery, Figure 4d shows that 0.30
of the subscriptions had a delivery ratio greater than 0.80 for
“All” messages. 0.50 of the subscriptions had a delivery ratio
greater than 0.70 for all messages. 0.25 of the subscriptions
had a delivery ratio of 0.80 for “1-hop” messages. Users
delivered 0.826 of the 967 messages via 1-hop. The additional
0.174 were delivered using 2-hops or more and is depicted in
“All”. The compactness of the social relationships between
the nodes discussed in Section VI-A partially explains why
the majority of the messages were delivered within “1-hop”.
Note the low density due to real people being able to operate
freely in a large city area (88km2), which resulted 0.93 of
the messages being delivered within in 94 hours of creation.
DTN simulations typically model 50 to 100 nodes in a con-
strained simulation space ranging between 0.25km2 - 4km2.
In addition, node mobility tends to become stationary, for at
least 5-8 hours a day due to the human requirement to sleep,
thus limiting possible interactions between nodes. The results
at such a low density provide promising insight into delay
tolerant social networks and suggest further investigations at
higher densities are needed.
VII. DEMONSTRATION
During the demonstration attendees will be able to down-
load AlleyOop Social on their iOS devices via Apple Test-
Flight. Users can follow friends, post new messages, as well
as toggle between DTN routing schemes inside the application.
We will demonstrate both the online and offline modes by dis-
connecting mobile devices from cellular and WiFi networks.
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